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This Term, the Supreme Court was presented with a prime opportunity 
to provide some much-needed clarification on a “backdrop” issue of law—
one of many topics that arises in a variety of legal contexts, but is rarely 
analyzed on its own terms. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina,1 the Court 
considered whether age was a relevant factor in determining if a suspect is 
“in custody” for Miranda purposes, and thus must have her rights read to 
her before being questioned by the police. Miranda, like dozens of other 
areas of law, employs a reasonable person test on the custodial question: it 
asks whether a reasonable person would, given the circumstances, believe 
that she is free to leave.2 The issue posed by J.D.B., then, was whether age 
counts as part of a suspect’s “circumstances” for Miranda purposes. 
Unfortunately, the Court’s June opinion managed only to compound the 
confusion and, in an ironic twist, did so while extolling the virtue of 
providing “clear guidance to the police.”3 This Essay critically examines 
the J.D.B. opinion, using it as a lens to both critique the traditional 
objective/subjective distinction and articulate a more honest interpretation of 
the reasonable person test—one based on the uncomfortable truth that the 
test is, at its core, arbitrary. 
I. THE CASE 
The facts in the case are straightforward. J.D.B. was a thirteen-year-old 
special education student whom the police suspected of breaking into a 
neighbor’s home and stealing several items, including a digital camera. 
While in school, J.D.B. was removed from his social studies class by a 
uniformed police officer, told the police wanted to talk to him, and escorted 
into a conference room with a police officer, the school’s assistant principal, 
and the assistant principal’s intern. The police officer began questioning the 
                                                                                                         
 * Law Clerk, The Honorable Roger L. Gregory, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit.  
 † Suggested citation: Christopher Jackson, Commentary, J.D.B. v. North Carolina 
and the Reasonable Person, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9 (2011), http://www. 
michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/jackson.pdf. 
 1. No. 09-11121, slip op. (U.S. June 16, 2011).  
 2. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).  
 3. J.D.B., 09-11121, slip op. at 8 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 
668 (2004)). 
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suspect about the burglary; before the officer read him his Miranda rights, 
he confessed. Two juvenile petitions were filed, and J.D.B. was eventually 
found delinquent. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that if a suspect is in 
custody, she must be informed of her Fifth Amendment rights before being 
interrogated.4 “In custody” covers more than an arrest: it includes any 
“restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal 
arrest.”5 In determining whether this standard is satisfied, the police must 
apply an objective test and ask whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s 
situation would “have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation and leave.”6 In J.D.B., the issue was whether age is a relevant 
circumstance to that question. The Court answered in the affirmative, 
holding in a 5–4 decision by Justice Sotomayor that “[s]o long as the 
child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or 
would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in 
the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.”7  
II. RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES 
The reasonable person test comes up in dozens of different areas of law, 
from Miranda’s in-custody analysis to negligence suits to criminal law self-
defense claims. And whenever this test is applied, the courts must 
determine which factors are relevant—that is, which facts about the situation 
they should include in the reasonable person inquiry. Factors like the 
physical location of the incident are intuitively relevant; the individual’s 
particular beliefs or desires, on the other hand, are not. And other 
considerations—like a person’s age—occupy a gray area, not falling easily 
into either camp. Unfortunately, there is no principled way to deal with 
these middle-of-the-road factors.  
In my attempt to try to prove a negative, let’s start by considering the 
way the Court and most commentators have tried to solve the problem: by 
appealing to the distinction between “objective” and “subjective” factors. In 
J.D.B., the Justices wrote, “As we have repeatedly emphasized, whether a 
suspect is ‘in custody’ is an objective inquiry.”8 The benefit of employing 
this objective test, they argue, is that “limiting analysis to the objective 
circumstances of the interrogation . . . avoids burdening the police.” with 
cumbersome rules that are difficult to apply.9  
There are several reasons why this distinction will not work. To begin 
with, the kinds of factors that we might want to label subjective, and thus 
                                                                                                         
 4. Miranda v. Arizona, 483 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). 
 5. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 667. 
 6. Id.; see also Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112. 
 7. J.D.B., slip op. at 14. 
 8. Id. at 7. 
 9. Id. at 8. 
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irrelevant to the reasonable person inquiry, are actually objective, in the 
sense that there’s a fact of the matter about them. There is, for example, a 
matter of fact about what kinds of experiences a person had in the past and 
what effect they have on her reasoning; we could incorporate these facts into 
an objective test by asking what a reasonable person with those particular 
experiences would do. But including all of the objective facts about a person 
(her age, past experiences, psychological makeup, mental states, physical 
characteristics, reactive attitudes, etc.) would collapse the test into an 
investigation of what that particular person in that particular case would 
do—precisely the outcome we want to avoid. And so, consistent with this 
reasoning, the Court has rejected a number of objective factors in applying 
the reasonable person test, including, in Alvarado, mental states and past 
interrogation history (though it incorrectly refused to call them objective 
factors). The word “subjective” is similarly unavailing. We might first 
think that “subjective” means something like “the person’s beliefs.” But 
that definition is underinclusive: there are a host of characteristics besides a 
person’s beliefs that we want to screen out of the reasonable person test, 
including her past experiences, desires, behavioral dispositions, and reactive 
attitudes. 
Perhaps the objective/subjective distinction is meant instead to track 
something like physical facts vs. psychological facts. “Psychological facts” 
seems to work better than the term “beliefs” because it can capture those 
irrelevant characteristics I just mentioned (past experiences, desires, etc.). 
But this alternative doesn’t do any better in the long run. First, on a wider 
view, the distinction between physical and psychological collapses in on 
itself: the reason why a person has a particular mental state is just because of 
certain physical facts that pertain—in particular, physical facts about that 
person’s brain. But it’s a fair point that as a matter of folk psychology, at 
least, we’re intuitively able to draw this distinction in a way that looks 
nonarbitrary, and this may provide us with guidance in distinguishing 
relevant factors from irrelevant ones under Miranda. Unfortunately, there are 
a number of factors we would readily categorize as psychological—and thus 
supposedly irrelevant to Miranda—that the Court would be compelled to 
include in the reasonable person test. Take language. To the extent a 
person’s language skills have to be classified as either physical or 
psychological, it seems clear they would fit into the latter: they have to do 
with the mental states that flow from a person’s hearing certain sounds, and 
they don’t keep good company with physical descriptors like height, 
weight, and eye color. But the Court would find it impossible to exclude 
facts about the language a suspect speaks in determining whether she is in 
custody. Consider a case where the police say, in Italian, “We are the 
police. We have placed you under arrest, and we are backed by the power of 
the State. If you try to leave, we will shoot you with our guns.” If the 
suspect speaks Italian, the Court couldn’t seriously argue that he wasn’t in 
custody because a reasonable, English-speaking person wouldn’t understand 
the threat. And the reverse is true as well: a suspect who doesn’t understand 
Italian couldn’t claim his Miranda rights were violated because a reasonable 
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Italian-speaking person would believe he was in custody. The language 
abilities of the particular suspect must be taken into account, and as a result, 
the objective/subjective distinction relied on by the J.D.B. majority must 
be rejected. 
The dissenting Justices in J.D.B. are well aware of these problems, but 
do not offer a compelling alternative. Justice Alito’s dissent has it right 
when he argues that the majority has backed itself into a corner: it must 
limit its decision by “arbitrarily distinguishing a suspect’s age from other 
personal characteristics . . . that may also correlate with susceptibility to 
coercive pressures,” or else turn Miranda into a “highly fact-intensive 
standard” that considers every personal trait of each defendant.10 Alito would 
instead have deemed relevant only the “external” circumstances of the 
interrogation, by which he means to exclude any fact about the suspect that 
we might think of as internal to her. He relies on the Court’s 2004 decision 
in Alvarado, which said, “Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and 
actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test and resolve 
the ultimate inquiry . . . .”11 Alito’s argument is deceptively persuasive: it 
neatly avoids tough line-drawing questions by screening out all of the 
suspect’s individual characteristics and considering only “where the 
questioning occurred, how long it lasted, what was said, any physical 
restraints  . . . and whether the suspect was allowed to leave when the 
questioning was through.”12 But adopting such a cramped view of Miranda 
would force the lower courts to ignore essential background facts. Take the 
suspect’s language ability, as I discussed above. That the defendant speaks 
Italian certainly isn’t a fact about the physical setting of the interrogation; 
it’s a fact internal to her and thus off the table under the dissent’s view. Or 
consider blindness, another specific (and thus internal) characteristic of the 
suspect that even the dissent admits is relevant to Miranda. Justice Alito, 
calling such a case a “far-fetched hypothetical,” writes that it “presumably” 
would only arise where the police give a blind person “a typed document 
advising him he [is] free to leave.”13 According to Alito, “[F]urnishing this 
advice in a form calculated to be unintelligible to the suspect would be 
tantamount to failing to provide the advice at all.” This is an accurate 
statement, but it is accurate precisely because blindness constitutes part of 
the reasonable person’s circumstances—the tension between the footnote 
and the dissent’s larger position is palpable. Alito goes on to claim that 
“advice by the police that a suspect is or is not free to leave at will has 
always been regarded as a circumstance” that must be taken into account. 
But that isn’t right. A statement by the police that a suspect is free to go 
                                                                                                         
 10. Id. at 3 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 11. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 662–63 (citation omitted).  
 12. J.D.B., slip op. at 6 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 16 n.16. I can think of a number of other situations where blindness would 
be relevant: where the police point a gun at the suspect; where the police quietly lock the 
door in front of the suspect; where the police show photos of a crime scene during the 
interrogation; and so on. 
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wouldn’t be relevant if the statement were given on the other side of a 
soundproof wall. The existence of the soundproof wall—a relevant 
circumstance—compels this conclusion. And it is only by assuming that 
blindness is also a relevant circumstance that we may draw a similar 
inference. 
III. WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 
If there is no principled way to determine which circumstances are 
relevant under Miranda’s reasonable person test, it is worth asking what the 
Court should base its decisions on. My aim is to sketch a few possibilities 
in the hope of generating further discussion.  
I start with four suggestions alluded to by the Court. I want to begin by 
noting a significant tension in the opinion: if J.D.B. is meant to track the 
objective/subjective distinction, it isn’t clear why the Court quickly ran 
through a few policy arguments. And if these arguments are meant to be the 
real justification for the holding, the Court throws them in much too 
cavalierly. In any case, the majority begins by noting that “in some 
circumstances, a child’s age would have affected how a reasonable person in 
the suspect’s position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.”14 While 
accurate, this reasoning applies equally well to other factors the Court has 
ruled are irrelevant: it would be just as correct to say, for example, that the 
suspect’s past interrogation history will affect how a reasonable person 
would perceive the situation.15 
The majority is also worried about administrability concerns, 
emphasizing the importance of “provid[ing] clear guidance to the police” 
about whom to Mirandize.16 There are two reasons why administrability 
gets much more airtime in the Court’s opinions than it should. First, ease 
of application isn’t exactly the driving force in the Court’s Miranda 
jurisprudence. After all, we could make the test easy to apply by saying the 
police must always inform the suspect of her rights. Second, it’s a very rare 
case where ease of application will make a practical difference. We would 
have to face a situation where the outcome of the case did in fact turn on the 
officer making the “correct” decision about whether to give a Miranda 
warning. This could only occur in a case where a police officer gave a 
Miranda warning when he wasn’t obligated to do so; the officer would have 
chosen not to give the warnings if the interrogation test were easier to 
apply; and the fact that he did give the warning when he wasn’t obligated to 
do so actually affected the outcome of the case. That’s a lot of assumptions, 
and my hunch is that such a case is quite rare. 
                                                                                                         
 14. Id. at 8 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
 15. See Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 668–69 (rejecting past interrogation history as a 
relevant circumstance). 
 16. J.D.B., slip op. at 8 (citing Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 668). 
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The Court also observes that “the law has historically reflected the . . .  
assumption that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise 
mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the 
world around them,”17 and gives several examples. This line of argument 
has promise, but much more needs to be said. As it stands, the Court’s 
analysis doesn’t go very far in explaining why age is a relevant 
circumstance in the Miranda context in particular: the law has traditionally 
treated insane people differently in any number of ways, but the Court has 
already decided that “the frailties and idiosyncrasies” of a suspect aren’t 
relevant.  
Finally, Sotomayor makes the curious claim that “the custody analysis 
would be nonsensical absent some consideration of the suspect’s age.”18 
How, the Court asks, could a court evaluate how a reasonable person would 
react to “objective circumstances that, by their very nature, are specific to 
children[,] without accounting for the age of the child subjected to those 
circumstances”?19 But it is perfectly sensible to make this evaluation: a 
court would simply ask what an adult would think if she were sitting in a 
seventh-grade class, told to go to the principal’s office, and then questioned. 
And if the Court is suggesting (as I think it is) that the inquiry is 
nonsensical because an adult can’t make sense of what it’s like for a child to 
be pulled from his seventh-grade class and questioned without referencing 
age, then it is assuming the conclusion it set out to prove: by asking what 
a child would think in that situation, the Court has already incorporated age 
into the test. A similar argument could be made about a person who is 
interrogated by the police in a mental hospital while she is suffering from a 
severe psychosis: how, I could ask, can a court evaluate how a reasonable 
person would react to objective circumstances that are, by their very nature, 
specific to psychotics? 
Apart from what we can squeeze out of the J.D.B. opinion itself, there 
are other ways we might distinguish relevant from irrelevant circumstances. 
First, the Court could base its decisions on a concern about coerced 
confessions.  This is, after all, the primary focus of Miranda, rooted as it is 
in the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. But as the J.D.B. 
dissent pointed out, even if the police were not obligated to give Miranda 
warnings in a particular case, the defendant could always argue that his 
confession was involuntary. Miranda warnings, the J.D.B. court reiterated, 
are a prophylactic measure. Miranda, then, could only make a practical 
difference in two ways: First, we would have to have a case where a 
confession was given; the confession was coerced; the trial court incorrectly 
found the confession was not coerced; the police weren’t obligated to give 
Miranda warnings; and if the police had given Miranda warnings, the 
suspect would not have confessed. Second, it would make a difference if the 
constitutional requirement that police give Miranda warnings in certain 
                                                                                                         
 17. Id. at 10. 
 18. Id. at 12. 
 19. Id. at 13. 
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situations somehow reduces, ex ante, the number of confessions police 
coerce and then use against the suspect. Again, I would think such 
situations are rather rare. There may be arguments to the contrary—
advocates may be able to create and analyze data that show Miranda makes 
a significant practical difference—but now the debate has shifted firmly into 
empirical territory, and the issue should be discussed on those terms, rather 
than having the Supreme Court declare by fiat that Miranda has a particular 
effect. 
A few other suggestions—ones I only point out for further thought—
include ensuring consistent application of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence 
by different courts; protecting against the violation of human dignity that 
occurs when state actors interrogate innocent suspects; and putting a greater 
emphasis on either positive or negative freedom (and with that, a 
concomitant focus on psychological or physical coercion). Miranda scholars 
have opinions about the purposes of that famous decision, and those 
opinions can inform the way we distinguish relevant from irrelevant 
circumstances. Or, we might decide that application of the reasonable person 
test shouldn’t vary depending on the area of law, and base our decisions on 
issues not specific to the Fifth Amendment. My only point here is that the 
answers to these issues are not obvious: the Court and academic 
commentators should tackle them head-on, rather than dressing up poorly 
constructed distinctions like the supposed differences between objective v. 
subjective or external v. internal facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The reasonable person test shows up again and again in dozens of areas 
of law, and yet the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the subject 
only further obfuscated its use and application, making an arbitrary 
distinction about which circumstances are relevant to the inquiry. The 
Court should instead defend these distinctions on alternative grounds—
grounds that are articulated and defended on their own terms.  
